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Abstract. This paper argues that Pritchard’s response to my argument that knowledge does 
not require safe belief is unsuccessful.  
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I. PRITCHARD’S RESPONSE TO ‘KNOWLEDGE AND SAFETY’ 
In a paper that also appears in this volume I argue against a view that has enjoyed a 
considerable degree of popularity in recent epistemology—viz. that knowledge requires safe 
belief. At the heart of my argument is a case in which a subject intuitively knows a 
proposition while his corresponding belief is unsafe. In short, the case features a powerful 
demon who has set his mind to getting the hero of the story to believe that it is 8.22. He is 
prepared to set the clock to 8.22 the very moment before our hero looks at it unless our hero 
looks at it at 8.22 of his own accord. As it so happens, the hero of the story happens to look at 
the clock precisely at 8.22 and the demon remains inactive. The clock is reliable and accurate, 
it reads 8.22, our hero exercises his ability to read the clock and, through the exercise of this 
ability, hits upon the truth about the time. Intuitively, our hero’s belief that it is 8.22 qualifies 
as knowledge. However, his belief is unsafe. There are many nearby possible worlds—some 
of them very close to the actual world—at which our hero looks at the clock a minute earlier 
or later. At those worlds the demon sets the clock to 8.22 anyways and our hero, whilst 
continuing to form his belief in the same way as in the actual world, ends up with a false 
belief. In this way, the example suggests that knowledge does not require safe belief.  
 In “Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?” Duncan Pritchard responds to my 
argument. The crucial move Pritchard makes in his response is to distinguish between 
knowledge and cognitive achievement. In a nutshell, Pritchard argues that, while the notions 
of knowledge and cognitive achievement are closely connected, they come apart. In 
particular, he provides reason to believe that one can attain a cognitive achievement that falls 
short of knowledge and argues that this is exactly what happens to the hero of the above story. 
In this way, Pritchard attempts to hold on to the idea that our hero lacks knowledge, whilst, at 
the same time, explaining away our intuition to the contrary: Since the notions of knowledge 
and cognitive achievement are so closely related they are also easily confused by intuitive 
judgment.  
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II. WHY PRITCHARD’S RESPONSE IS UNSUCCESSFUL 
 In what follows, I will briefly outline a problem that Pritchard’s response to my 
argument faces. True, the problem is generated by a further assumption. However, since the 
assumption enjoys independent plausibility, I take the following line of thought to exert 
strong pressure on Pritchard’s response to my argument. Moreover, since Pritchard endorses 
the assumption, at the very least it will be shown that his response to my argument is not 
available to Pritchard himself.  
 The assumption that is needed to generate the problem is the following: Knowledge 
does not require cognitive achievement, and, more specifically, in certain cases of testimonial 
knowledge the subject does not attain a cognitive achievement. This assumption can be made 
plausible by cases due to Jennifer Lackey (2007) who uses them to make the closely related 
point that subjects do not always deserve credit for what they know. In fact, however, 
Pritchard himself (2007 and forthcoming) uses such cases to argue specifically that one can 
know without having attained a cognitive achievement. In Pritchard’s version of the case, the 
heroine of the story arrives at the train station in an unfamiliar city and asks for directions to a 
famous landmark. Her knowledgeable informant gives her accurate directions on the basis of 
which our heroine forms a true belief as to where the landmark is. Intuitively, her belief 
qualifies as knowledge. At the same time, argues Pritchard, our heroine does not attain a 
cognitive achievement when she forms her belief about the location of the landmark. After all, 
achievements require that the success involved in the achievement be creditable to the 
achiever. In the present case, however, our heroine’s success—her hitting upon the truth—is 
not creditable to her. Rather, the credit goes to the knowledgeable informant. So, our heroine 
knows, via testimony, where the landmark is despite having failed to secure a cognitive 
achievement.  
 If Pritchard’s case works in the way envisaged, then there is reason to believe, first, 
that knowledge does not require attainment of a cognitive achievement, and, second, that 
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there are cases of testimonial knowledge in which the subject acquires knowledge but fails to 
attain a cognitive achievement. Now, why is that result problematic for Pritchard’s response 
to my argument against the safety condition on knowledge? The reason is that we can easily 
construct cases parallel in the relevant respects to both Prichard’s case of knowledge without 
cognitive achievement and to my case of knowledge without safe belief. Thus consider the 
following variation of my original case: Suppose our hero of the first case is in the same city 
as our heroine of the second case. He wants to know what time it is, and thus decides to ask 
the next passer-by, who happens to be our heroine. Our heroine looks at her watch, which is 
reliable and accurate as always, sees that it reads exactly twelve o’clock and tells our hero that 
it is exactly twelve o’clock. On the basis of this testimony, our hero forms a belief that it is 
exactly twelve o’clock. Intuitively, his belief qualifies as knowledge. But now suppose that, 
just as in the original case, a powerful demon, who had set his mind to getting our hero to 
believe that it is exactly twelve o’clock, was lurking in the background. The demon would 
have manipulated our hero’s informant’s watch if our hero had not happened to ask his 
informant at exactly twelve o’clock of his own accord. Since there is a wide range of nearby 
and very close nearby possible worlds at which our hero asks his informant a minute earlier or 
later, there is a wide range of nearby and very close nearby possible worlds at which he 
acquires a false belief via testimony from his informant. Hence, his belief is not safe. 
Importantly, given that Pritchard’s analysis of testimony cases is correct, there is reason to 
believe that, in the present case, our hero does not attain a cognitive achievement when he 
acquires a true belief about the time. Recall that, according to Pritchard’s analysis, 
achievements require that the success involved in the achievement be creditable to the 
achiever. However, in the present case, our hero’s success—his hitting upon the truth about 
the time—is not creditable to him. Rather, it is creditable to our heroine who does all the 
relevant cognitive work. In consequence, our hero does not attain a cognitive achievement 
when he forms a belief about the time. Given that this is so, it can easily be seen that 
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Pritchard’s response will not be successful against my argument that knowledge does not 
require safe belief. After all, we now have a case in which, intuitively, the subject knows, 
while, at the same time, her belief is unsafe and she does not attain a cognitive achievement. 
Our intuition that the subject knows can no longer be explained away by claiming, first, that 
the subject attains a cognitive achievement that falls short of knowledge and, second, that 
since the notions of knowledge and cognitive achievement are so closely related they are also 
easily confused by intuitive judgment.  
Again, my argument depends on the assumption that Pritchard’s claim that, in the 
relevant testimony cases, the subjects know without having attained a cognitive achievement 
is correct. However, to the extent that Pritchard’s analysis of these cases is plausible, we have 
independent reason to believe that it is. In consequence, the argument presented in this paper 
provides reason to believe that Pritchard’s response to my argument against the safety 
condition is unsuccessful. At the very least, however, it shows that his response to my 
argument against safety is not available to Pritchard himself. 
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